The gap within the Sunni community was also tempting, and Hezbollah has succeeded in infiltrating the most vulnerable parts of that community.ĭespite the Saudi decision to retreat from Lebanon’s political scene, Hezbollah continued to challenge Saudi Arabia with fiery statements, accusing it of supporting the Islamic State in Syria. and Hezbollah and its allies won the parliamentary elections in 2018, taking over most of the security, financial, and political decisions in Lebanon, which led the country to a historic breakdown and financial collapse. In 2016, Michel Aoun became the president of Lebanon and Iran’s puppet.
Hariri lost Saudi support, but the kingdom was no longer interested in finding a replacement or empowering what was left of the March 14 coalition.Īs Saudi Arabia disengaged, Iran quickly filled the power gap. Lebanon became a disappointment, and moved to the bottom of Saudi Arabia’s priorities in the region. Meanwhile, March 14 leadership was hit with assassinations, threats, and compromises, as Saudi Arabia grew more troubled by Iran’s growing influence and military power in the Gulf and in Yemen. Yet these hopes were soon shattered when Hariri decided to compromise with Hezbollah. This political coalition was heavily supported-financially and politically-by Saudi Arabia, which hoped that the son, Saad Hariri, would continue his father’s work.
When Hariri finally recognized the difficulty of balancing the Syrian-Iranian political agenda in Lebanon with his own economic and development plans, Hezbollah assassinated him in 2005, leading to mass protests and the formation of the March 14 coalition. Former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri-whom the kingdom considered a loyal citizen of both countries-managed to fulfill Saudi’s plan in Lebanon, which was focused on reconstruction, investments, and development of the financial sector-with little attention to the war’s collective history, sectarian politics, or the growing Syrian hegemony in Lebanon. dollars to reconstruct the country and to counteract the mounting influence of the Iranian regime. The Taif Accord that ended the civil war in Lebanon in 1990 was the beginning of Saudi involvement, sending billions of U.S. The kingdom is walking a thin line between its unease with regard to Iran’s expanding control of the Lebanese state and its desire to help a fragile country, which retains at least tangential importance for the international community. Today, Saudi Arabia no longer sees Lebanon as a priority-Yemen, Gulf security, and its own economic and social policies take precedence-but it still cannot abandon Lebanon completely. However, the kingdom has also been harboring a different kind of resentment-one that stems from the deceitfulness of its closest Lebanese allies.
The main reason for Saudi’s disenchantment with Lebanon is the power of Hezbollah and its Iranian patron. The story of the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Lebanon has been marked by cycles of friendship and hostility, sometimes simultaneously-a love-hate relationship that eventually kept Saudi Arabia at bay, but not completely absent.
0 kommentar(er)
